The Paradox Of Repression And Nonviolent Movements by Kurtz, L. R. & Smithey, Lee A.
1
1
Introduction
Nonviolent Strategy and Repression Management
Lee A .  Smithey a nd Lester R.  Kurtz
“It is not repression that destroys a movement,” warns one of our con-
tributors, George Lakey. “It is repression plus lack of preparation” 
(1973, 111). From Bull Connor’s dogs and fire hoses attacking US civil 
rights demonstrators to the massacre at Amritsar in colonial India, 
the use of coercive force against dissidents often backfires, becom-
ing a transformative event (Sewell 1996; Shultziner, chapter 3 in this 
volume) that can change the course of a conflict. Rather than demo-
bilizing a movement, repression often ironically fuels resistance and 
undercuts the legitimacy of a power elite. Although a long scholarly 
tradition explores the unintended consequences of martyrdom and 
other acts of violence, more attention could be paid to what we call 
the paradox of repression, that is, when repression creates unantici-
pated consequences that authorities do not desire. Efforts by power 
elites to oppress movements often backfire, as Brian Martin (2007) 
calls it, mobilizing popular support for the movements and undermin-
ing authorities, potentially leading to significant reforms or even a 
regime’s overthrow.
Our goal in this volume is to examine multiple aspects of the para-
dox of repression; in our own experience while exploring various social 
movements around the world and observing daily news reports, we 
now see this paradox in many spheres of life, historical epochs, and 
geographical regions of the world (see Kurtz 1986; Smithey and Kurtz 
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2003; Lyng and Kurtz 1985). In this chapter, we will introduce the 
concept and explore its relevance to empirical cases that this ensemble 
of authors has researched. In our conclusion (chapter 12), we discuss 
its possibilities and implications for future research. We have designed 
the volume to incorporate contributions from both scholars of social 
movements studies and practitioners of nonviolent civil resistance who 
have firsthand experience of repression and who have worked to man-
age it proactively through the careful and strategic use of nonviolent 
methods. Our purpose is to develop a better sense of the topography 
of the concept and discuss how it might enrich our studies of collective 
action, contentious politics, and social movements.
Repression and Its Paradoxes
In an asymmetrical conflict, when actors representing the status quo 
use force (psychological, physical, economic, or otherwise) to repress 
their opponents—especially those engaged in nonviolent move-
ments—the use of coercion often backfires. As civil rights activist, 
clergyman, and author Will Campbell writes, “Of one thing I am cer-
tain: [the civil rights movement] was not destroyed by hooded vigi-
lantes and flaming crosses. Nor by chains used on school children, 
dynamiting of churches and homes, mass jailings. All those things 
were an impetus to the Movement and brought determination to the 
victims” (1986, 198; cf. Durkheim [1893] 1984; Erikson 1966). Repres-
sive coercion can weaken a regime’s authority, turning public opinion 
against it. Paradoxically, the more a power elite applies force, the more 
citizens and third parties are likely to become disaffected, sometimes 
inducing the regime to disintegrate from internal dissent.
Repression involves efforts by people in power to demobilize dis-
sent and social movements resisting a regime, corporation, or other 
influential institutions. Drawing upon Goldstein (1978), Christian 
Davenport (2007a, 1) observes that most scholars of repression define 
it as “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an indi-
vidual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, 
for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deter-
ring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to 
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government personnel, practices or institutions.” We prefer to see 
repression as a much more complex phenomenon that goes far beyond 
physical threats or sanctions. As we discuss more fully in chapter 8, 
“‘Smart’ Repression,” we find it conceptually helpful to place these 
methods along a continuum stretching from overt violence, on one 
end, to hegemony on the other (Figure 1.1). Viewing repression from 
this broad perspective helps to correct some of the narrowness of pre-
vious research, which Davenport and Inman (2012, 621) note has been 
“predominantly rationalist and structuralist in orientation, with cul-
tural approaches being more recent and less mainstream.”
Overt violence includes the actions we usually think of when we 
consider repression, such as beatings, torture, shooting unarmed dem-
onstrators, and arrests. They are the repressive tactics most likely to 
cause moral outrage within the broader population and are, therefore, 
more likely to precipitate backfire. Because authorities are sometimes 
aware of the risks involved in using brute force, they may employ 
less-lethal methods such as pepper spray or “active denial systems” or 
simply intimidate activists with indirect threats, harassment, or sur-
veillance. Soft repression, a concept developed by Myra Marx Ferree 
(2005) includes such actions as stigmatization of protesters and their 
movements, framing contests, and manipulative attempts to divide, 
divert, or distract social movement organizations or their pool of 
potential recruits. “The distinguishing criterion of soft repression,” 
Marx Ferree explains, “is the collective mobilization of power, albeit 
in nonviolent forms and often highly informal ways, to limit and 
exclude ideas and identities from the public forum” (141). Although 
she develops the concept to explain gender-based movements, it is a 
strategy widely used by power elites to minimize the participation of 
movements and dissidents. Finally, the most effective demobilization 
1.1. A Continuum of Demobilization (Source: Lee A. Smithey and Lester R. 
Kurtz)
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technique used by authorities is the promotion of hegemony, in which 
dissidents censor themselves (for more details, see chapter 8).
Relational Nature of Conflict and Power
The paradox of repression functions more powerfully when challeng-
ers take advantage of the relational nature of conflict and the multiple 
sources of power posited in the work of scholars such as Georg Simmel 
([1908] 1971), Mohandas K. Gandhi ([1945] 1967), Gene Sharp (1973, 
2005), and Nancy Bell (2008). Conflict, as Simmel contends, is not the 
opposite of cooperation but of apathy or not knowing. That is, conflict 
is itself a form of interaction, a fundamental aspect of human nature 
that cannot be eliminated, but can be carried out by a variety of means 
along a spectrum from the most violent (e.g., thermonuclear war) to 
the most nonviolent (Kurtz 1992).
Repression is the expression of one type of power—often exerted 
under the assumption that it will crush the “powerless” or at least 
prevent or mitigate their insurgency. If, however, multiple sources of 
power are available to parties, and conflict is negotiated as a form of 
interaction, repression may not be accepted by its targets. Further-
more, bystanders may come to perceive a social movement’s program 
and activities in a new light if they are repulsed by an elite’s acts of 
repression against the movement; others outside of the local power 
elite may choose to take a role in questioning the authority of a regime.
Following Gandhi’s lead in redefining power, Gene Sharp (1973; 
2005) shows how insurgents can change their perspectives on power so 
that even political power is not seen as monolithic but is the result of 
multiple sources of power, the most important being the “consent” of 
the governed.1 Nancy Bell’s (2008) article on alternative conceptions 
1. The term consent has become standard in the nonviolent action literature and
refers to the simple proposition that large institutions, and states in particular, can 
only function because a sufficient number of people consent to cooperate in their 
functioning. Once participants begin to withdraw their participation, the institution 
necessarily weakens unless the disobedient can be easily replaced, requiring further 
mobilization for resistance. The word consent is perhaps an unfortunate choice as it 
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of power explores, in similar fashion, the difference between coercive 
“power over,” on the one hand, and “power to,” or cooperative empow-
erment, on the other (cf. Kurtz 2005). The former is “the traditional 
definition of power that focuses on power as domination, generally 
maintained through authority, force, or coercion,” whereas the alter-
native perspective “focuses on power as ‘empowerment,’ ability, com-
petence” (Bell 2008, 1703–4). Advocates of “power over” consider the 
accumulation of power a zero sum game, in which one side wins and 
the other loses. Conversely, “empowerment theories emphasize power 
relationships based on the assumption that the availability of power 
(as ability, competence, energy) is unlimited and that the dynamics of 
power relationships can be of the “both/and” or “win/win” variety. “In 
other words, power is potentially exercised by all people involved in an 
interaction, and an increase of power on one side does not necessarily 
lead to a lessening of power on the other” (1704).
Thus, empowerment theorists (often women) define power as an 
attribute rather than something one owns or commands (see French 
1985); they view it instead as a process or an interactive dynamic, a 
communal phenomenon. This shift is especially helpful in look-
ing at what are usually considered asymmetrical power relationships 
between the “weak” and the “powerful.” Moreover, as Bell (2008, 
1705) notes, “people in communities are held together by common 
interests, which serve as the catalyst for the exercise of ‘power from 
below.’ Power in this context is not seen as limited in quantity, but is 
rather a regenerative phenomenon.” We join Bell in reconceptualiz-
ing power and locating it both within and between groups in relation 
(including opponents in conflict), not as a free-floating resource that 
can be accumulated and deployed by elites.
Similarly, Gandhi ([1945] 1967) contends, “Even the most despotic 
government cannot stand except for the consent of the governed, 
could be interpreted to imply a conscious and willful agreement to participate in 
one’s own domination. We believe obedience or compliance are better terms, as neither 
suggests approval of a corrupt elite.
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which consent is often forcibly procured by the despot. Immediately 
the subject ceases to fear the despotic force, his power is gone” (313). 
When the “so-called master” attempts to force obedience, “You will 
say: ‘No, I will not serve you for your money or under a threat.’ This 
may mean suffering. Your readiness to suffer will light the torch of 
freedom which can never be put out” (313). When people are mobilized 
for noncooperation on a collective scale, as they were in the Indian 
Freedom Movement, the most powerful entities (such as the British 
Empire) may be unable to repress insurgents effectively because even 
their brutality becomes a starting point for increasing opposition.
With this sort of relational perspective on power and the possibil-
ity of noncooperation, the “weak,” as Bell (2008, 1705) puts it, “are 
redefined as an important part of power interactions and their role 
becomes a primary focus of interest in alternative theories.” Nonvio-
lent activists do not simply absorb repression and accept it passively 
but anticipate it strategically as part of a sophisticated interaction, 
which they can shape (see Ackerman and DuVall 2000). Michel Fou-
cault (1980, 116) calls this power at the grassroots level the “concrete 
nature of power”; that is, that which can be seen in daily struggles 
rather than in the state and other social institutions designed to create 
and maintain power from above (cf. Scott 1990). When mobilized, it 
can drive a resistance movement.
Thus, Sharp (1973, 2005) claims that nonviolent actionists, as he 
calls them, should not be dismayed or surprised at repression—it is, 
rather, a sign that their action constitutes a serious threat to the regime. 
If the protesters persist, the regime’s problems may be aggravated:
As cruelties to nonviolent people increase, the opponent’s regime 
may appear still more despicable, and sympathy and support for the 
nonviolent side may increase. The general population may become 
more alienated from the opponent and more likely to join the resis-
tance. Persons divorced from the immediate conflict may show 
increased support for the victims of the repression. Although the 
effect of national and international public opinion varies, it may 
at times lead to significant political and economic pressures. The 
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opponent’s own citizens, agents, and troops, disturbed by brutalities 
against nonviolent people, may begin to doubt the justice of his poli-
cies. Their initial uneasiness may grow into internal dissent and at 
times even into such action as strikes and mutinies. Thus, if repres-
sion increases the numbers of nonviolent actionists and enlarges 
defiance, and if it leads to sufficient internal opposition among the 
opponent’s usual supporters to reduce his capacity to deal with the 
defiance, it will clearly have rebounded against him. This is political 
jiu-jitsu at work. (1973, 113)
Of course, nonviolent activists are not the only actors in a conflict 
trying to affect backfire and its effects. As Brian Martin asserts (2007, 
2012, and in his foreword to this volume), people in power com-
monly use five types of methods to minimize backfire: “covering up 
the action, devaluing the target, reinterpreting the events (by lying, 
minimizing consequences, blaming others, and reframing), using offi-
cial channels to give an appearance of justice, and intimidating and 
rewarding people involved.” McDonald, Graham and Martin (2010) 
call this the “outrage management model.”
Gandhi, Sharp, Gregg ([1938] 2007), and others have clearly estab-
lished the fundamentals of the paradox of repression, but the circum-
stances in which it occurs, or how activists manage it, are less well 
understood. We turn now to a closer examination of the interaction 
between repression and resistance and attempts by nonviolent activists 
to take advantage of the paradox of repression.
Repression and Dissidence
The question of the relationship between repression and collective 
action is well worn but unsatisfactorily developed. Neither empirical 
studies nor theories of the impact of repression on social movements 
are conclusive, although statistical empirical evidence for the backfire 
effect is growing (e.g., Chenoweth and Stefan 2011; Sutton, Butcher, 
and Svensson 2014), confirming widespread case study and anecdotal 
support. In their review of “almost everything we know about state 
repression,” Davenport and Inman (2012) note that the dominant 
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research on repression assumes that political leaders calculate costs 
and benefits of coercive action and use a rational decision-making cal-
culus to decide whether or not to employ repression. They contend 
that four findings in the study of repression are persistently impor-
tant: first, “domestic factors such as democracy and political dissent 
generally outweigh the importance of international factors like trade 
dependence/globalization and the signing/ratifying of international 
human rights treaties. Second, we know that economic development 
measured by GNP per capita decreases state repression” (621).
A third finding, they contend, is more problematic: although pre-
vious studies show that democratic polities are less likely to repress, 
Davenport and Armstrong (2004) found that “democratic institutions 
have no impact on government coercive activity, but that above a spe-
cific threshold (e.g., above 0.8 on the Polity measure), democracy influ-
ences repression in a negative and linear manner as generally believed” 
(Davenport and Inman 2012, 622). Finally, studies of repression show 
that “when authorities are challenged with some form of conflict, they 
engage in some form of repressive action—simply, threatened govern-
ments normally respond with force” (622).
But what is the impact of repression on levels of resistance? That, 
Davenport and Inman assert, is more problematic; indeed, “repression 
has been found to have every single influence on behavioral challenges, 
including no influence” (2012, 624). One explanation for this conun-
drum is that “researchers generally ignore the fact that upon being 
repressed, dissidents could change tactics.” In fact, a major goal of this 
volume is to explore repression management by social activists: How 
can those challenging a system anticipate, plan for, and shape, the con-
sequences of repressive events? Looking at qualitative insights on the 
impact of repression, Davenport and Inman conclude that “repressive 
behavior is unable to curb challenging activity; however, the reasons 
for this influence vary significantly” (625).
As Opp and Roehl (1990) observe, “deprivation theory, resource 
mobilization theory, and the theory of collective action make differ-
ent predictions about the effects of repression on political protest” 
(521). We do not presume to resolve that issue here. Clearly in some 
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situations, repression works for the authorities, whereas in other situ-
ations it backfires. We have an insufficient number of empirical case 
studies to make any clear generalizations about the conditions under 
which repression actually promotes movement goals, although both 
theorists and researchers suggest a range of possibilities.
Some scholars emphasize ways in which repression may mitigate 
protest (see, for example, Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Others, how-
ever, examine how it facilitates movement organizing (Gerlach and 
Hine 1970), while still others suggest that the relationship assumes an 
inverted U-shape (Gurr 1970) in which low levels of repression can be 
effective in undermining preliminary mobilization and very high lev-
els of repression can demobilize or destroy a movement (e.g., Tianan-
men Square). Once mobilization gains momentum, however, and has 
broad popular support, only high levels of repression can quench it. 
Some have asserted that regimes and opposition movements react to 
one another and reach a state of equilibrium (Francisco 1995, 1996; 
Gartner and Regan 1996). When Goodwin and Jasper (2012, 289) 
conducted a comparative analysis of fifty case studies of social move-
ments to test political opportunity theory, they found unexpectedly 
that social movements were more likely to emerge under intense or 
increasing repression (nine of their fifty cases) than in situations where 
declining repression was a significant factor (seven of the fifty). Frank-
lin (2015) found that in Latin America, repression filters out challeng-
ers that are less committed, so that repressive conditions lead to more 
persistent challengers.
Whereas most social movement scholars study repression from 
the point of view of the movement response to repression, Christian 
Davenport (1995) explored how fifty-three states responded to per-
ceived threats from social movements in a time series analysis from 
1948 to 1993, an issue that we will address in chapter 8.
We are particularly interested in those situations in which repres-
sion does serve paradoxically to strengthen social movements, and we 
seek to broaden our understanding of the factors contributing to this 
phenomenon. The resource mobilization perspective assumes that 
any society has enough discontent to fuel a social movement but that 
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potential activists assess a risk-reward ratio before deciding to partici-
pate (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1978). Repression 
constitutes one potential cost of participation that will deter individu-
als from participating unless other rewards, such as those forthcoming 
from movement success, relationships with other activists, or a moti-
vating sense of moral outrage, can compensate for the anticipated costs.
In the political process model, the prevalence of political and other 
opportunities external to the movement, such as divided elites within 
the regime, economic shifts, or the development of third party support, 
also influence assessments of the prospects for movement success and 
thus mobilization (Kriesi 2004; McAdam 1982). Emphasis on cost and 
opportunity, however, encourages scholars who approach the problem 
from the standpoint of the regime to ask which strategy or combina-
tion of repression and concession is most likely to shape an opposition 
movement’s analysis of opportunities and thus pacify it (Goldstone 
and Tilly 2001). We believe it is equally important to examine mobili-
zation processes, strategizing within movements, and how movements 
can create opportunities, even in the face of repression.
Opp and Roehl (1990) conducted one of the earliest up-close quan-
titative analyses of the paradox of repression. They studied attitudes 
toward protest before and after a major repressive event against an 
antinuclear power movement they studied in Germany. Indeed, they 
found that people were radicalized by the repression and became 
more motivated to participate in the movement. They concluded that 
repression interacts with movement micromobilization processes in 
which solidary incentives and cognitive liberation can compensate for 
high levels of repression.2
Similar results emerged from Marwan Khawaja’s (1993) sophisti-
cated multidimensional quantitative measurement of repression that 
2. In social movement studies terminology, solidary incentives refers to the emo-
tional psychological or other benefits accrued from personal relationships developed 
with other activists. Cognitive liberation refers to the dawning belief among individu-
als that a movement could be successful, encouraging them to participate.
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looks at both collective and individual sanctions against Palestinians on 
the West Bank reported in a sample of Palestinian and Israeli newspa-
pers between 1976 and 1985. Actions against individuals included “the 
use of tear gas, acts of beating, shooting, unlocking stores, threat of 
‘negative sanctions’ against organizers or protestors (including threats 
to close schools), dispersion by force, and arrest” (55). Collective 
repression variables include the indiscriminate use of intimidating or 
provocative methods by the army, including curfews, closing schools or 
shops by military orders, military checkpoints, home-to-home searches, 
“invasions” of (or breaking into) places such as colleges, military “raids,” 
and subsequent sieges on towns. “Provocations” involved actions such 
as the army’s ordering bystanders or passersby to perform various kinds 
of physical actions, including standing on one foot against walls, sitting 
blindfolded on the floor for several hours, or removing stones from the 
streets (56). Although both relative deprivation and resource mobiliza-
tion theory expect repression to decrease the level of collective action, 
most of the repressive measures against Palestinians—especially those 
directed against individuals—preceded increased collective action. 
Repression seems to have increased the ability of movement leaders to 
frame the regime in a way that encouraged the resolve of Palestinians 
and heightened their involvement in resistance.
Opp and Roehl’s and Khawaja’s findings suggest that decisions and 
strategies within social movement organizations bear on the impact 
of repression. William Gamson’s (1975) analysis of authority-partisan 
interaction similarly suggests that the probability of collective action 
can be increased by movement strategies. Tarrow (1994, 88) points out 
that movement organizations can make new political opportunities by 
beginning to weaken the establishment, thus signaling the possibil-
ity of resistance by other organizations. In short, the methods and 
tactics social movement organizations deploy matter in the balance 
of power between regimes and challengers. Movement organizations 
can plan and execute strategies that enhance mobilization and influ-
ence the outcome of a struggle. Kurt Schock’s (2005) groundbreaking 
book on unarmed insurgencies is perhaps the first to explicitly bridge 
the nonviolent action literature with the political process model, and 
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while he rightly emphasizes the effects of complex opportunity struc-
tures on dissent, he also emphasizes the capacity of movements to use 
nonviolent tactics to take best advantage of opportunities and to resist 
even under high levels of repression.
Nonviolence and the Paradox of Repression
Certainly, opportunity structures change. Economic crises exacerbate 
grievances, and divisions within elites can embolden challengers, but 
the strategy and tactics of the movement interact with opportunity 
structures, the regime, and the public. To the extent that the move-
ment can tailor its tactics to prevailing circumstances, it might shift 
advantage from the power elites.
Many activists are learning how to cultivate the right circum-
stances to take advantage of the paradox of repression. As Jonathan 
Schell (2003) eloquently asserts in The Unconquerable World, one of the 
most profound legacies within modernity has been the realization of 
popular nonviolent power. The last century produced a surge of inno-
vation in nonviolent conflict strategies and methods, many of which 
have made effective use of the paradox of repression. (Violent insur-
gencies may also sometimes benefit from the paradox of repression, 
but their own use of violence can undermine and diminish support 
within their own communities and especially among third parties.)
Despite its ubiquity, the obscurity of the paradox of repression 
should not be particularly surprising. It is most apparent in conflicts 
in which one party employs strategic nonviolent strategy. However, it 
is only in the twentieth century that we witness the prodigious expan-
sion of nonviolence corresponding with globalization and accelerating 
technological development. In a globalizing world where communi-
cations, travel, and arms technologies have become widely available, 
even small pockets of resistance have developed the capacity to chal-
lenge more traditionally powerful institutions, such as corporations 
and states.
Greater international interdependence requires economic and 
political cooperation across an increasingly complex network of cross-
cutting alliances. The use of coercive force in this environment may 
Introduction | 13
offend or inconvenience mutual allies and neighbors and leave an 
aggressor isolated. The United States has experienced this dilemma in 
connection with the invasion of Iraq. Despite considerable support from 
the United Kingdom, the Bush administration encountered significant 
obstacles in cobbling together a coalition of smaller, less influential 
states. Larger states on the United Nations Security Council, such as 
France, Germany, and Russia, probably declined to participate in part 
because of significant economic interests in the region, but they were 
also under pressure from their own citizens who sympathized with the 
Iraqi people and considered the invasion unjustified aggression.
The structure of insurgent groups has also changed to take advan-
tage of ever-emerging electronic communications technologies, such 
as fax machines, the Internet, cell phones, and instant messaging, while 
limiting the ability of authorities to repress resistance. Nonviolent 
direct action sometimes takes on the form of cell or affinity groups 
developed by non-state terror organizations to avoid repression. How-
ever, this trend may diminish the paradox of repression. As we will see 
shortly, the paradox of repression relies in large part not on avoiding 
repression but on enduring and sometimes provoking it.3 In order for 
insurgents to invoke the sympathy and outrage of bystander publics, 
these publics must relate to and identify with the target of repression. 
Although affinity groups may make resistance groups appear shadowy 
and unrecognizable, much important organizing for nonviolent cam-
paigns has taken place underground. The latter approach is more likely 
to prove effective in highly asymmetrical scenarios, where there is little 
ambiguity over public sympathies and the illegitimacy of a regime.
The paradox of repression is one manifestation of what the pre-
eminent scholar of nonviolence, Gene Sharp (1973, 2005), calls “politi-
cal jiu-jitsu.” In the martial art of jiu-jitsu, one uses the weight and 
momentum of one’s opponent to throw the opponent. Similarly, in 
3. George Lakey warns against provoking repression because it “may alienate
the revolutionaries from the people, brutalize the police, and even brutalize the 
demonstrators” (1973, 106).
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strategic nonviolent action, one can use an opponent’s resources, 
needs, and culture to one’s own advantage. Thus, for example, arrests 
and imprisonment have always been a primary tool of governmental 
authorities against agents of social change. Nonviolent activists, how-
ever, have often prepared for arrest and willingly accepted or even 
sought incarceration in order to overload jails and strain government 
bureaucracies. The same dynamic can apply to the use of cultural 
resources to trigger the paradox of repression. Richard Gregg ([1938] 
2007) first wrote about this dynamic as “moral jiu-jitsu,” drawing on 
Gandhi’s idea that self-suffering would induce conversion by an oppo-
nent, who, when confronted by a nonviolent resister, would lose “the 
moral support which the violent resistance of most victims would ren-
der him” (44).
As students and activists of nonviolence understand, the paradox 
of repression can be cultivated. True, in some cases, such as the eth-
nic cleansing of Native Americans, repression has been so complete as 
to overcome nearly all resistance. In other cases, however, where the 
relationship between opponents has been better integrated and where 
those traditionally considered less powerful have developed effective 
methods of resistance (such as cell structures and nonviolent collective 
action techniques), imperial and authoritarian states have found them-
selves unable to contend with grassroots opposition, often because the 
movement was able to rob the regime of some of its legitimacy. While 
the overtly systematic use of nonviolent collective action theory varies 
widely from case to case, training and strategic planning continues to 
spread. The cases we offer as illustrations do not always document an 
intentional preparation for the paradox of repression (though prepara-
tion is common, as we elaborate below) but indicate how challengers 
adopted collective action tactics that often both amplified and sub-
verted attempts to repress and intimidate nonviolent activists.
Repression Management
We have set aside a portion of this volume to address what we call repres-
sion management, or the idea that social movement organizations can 
increase the likelihood of the paradox of repression occurring through 
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preparation, mobilization, strategy, and tactical choice. Repression 
management might include preparing to withstand repression, tem-
porarily avoiding repression, or choreographing confrontations with 
opponents in ways that are more likely to produce the disgust that 
can occur when nonviolent activists suffer repression. Framing (Snow 
et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000) or interpreting repression for 
publics through the media, social networks, and other communica-
tions outlets in such a way that it induces moral outrage is also impor-
tant. We follow Kurt Schock in his book Unarmed Insurrections: People 
Power Movements in Nondemocracies (2005), in which he calls for social 
movement scholars to further explore “how the characteristics and 
actions of a challenge affects (sic) the repression-dissent relationships. 
Whether repression crushes dissent or promotes mobilization depends 
on a variety of conditions other than the level of repression, some of 
which may be at least within partial control of challenging groups, 
such as how the challenge is organized, movement strategy, the range 
of methods and mix of actions implemented, the targets of dissent, and 
communication within the movement and with third parties” (157). 
Several authors in this volume approach the paradox of repression 
from this pragmatic or strategic perspective.
Contributions of This Volume
The chapters in this book have two main goals: to gain a more nuanced 
understanding of how the paradox of repression works and when it has 
happened, on the one hand, and to examine how nonviolent activ-
ists have managed it, on the other, to enhance the extent to which it 
empowers movements and undermines unjust systems. We hope this 
volume will be valuable to scholars and activists alike, and we have 
recruited both scholars and activists as chapter authors (including sev-
eral authors who are both). The first task of the contributors to this 
volume is thus to look at various aspects and cases of the paradox of 
repression to get a better sense of its topography beyond the isolated 
anecdotal cases diffused through the scholarly literature and activ-
ists’ lore. We provide a conceptual and empirical overview and bring 
together quantitative and qualitative scholarship with activists who 
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have experienced repression and experimented with its management. 
We begin with Erica Chenoweth’s quantitative birdseye view of the 
phenomenon across the globe over half a century. Chapter 2, “Backfire 
in Action: Insights from Nonviolent Campaigns, 1945–2006,” analyzes 
her large data set comparing 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns for 
major change to evaluate how backfire works and which movement 
features are most likely to provoke it.
Chenoweth identifies three critical factors facilitating a positive 
outcome from repression: (1) sustained high levels of campaign par-
ticipation, (2) loyalty shifts among security forces and civilian leaders, 
and (3) the withdrawal of support from its foreign allies.
Doron Shultziner’s conceptual chapter addresses a key aspect of 
the paradox of repression by delving into two historical cases. In chap-
ter 3, “Transformative Events, Repression, and Regime Change,” he 
focuses on the central tension between the parameters of opportunity 
structures and the agency of collective action. He explores the social 
psychological impact of “transformative events,” which can some-
times suspend the habits and assumptions that normally underpin 
the political status quo and open up new opportunities for resistance. 
Transformative events that involve repression can thus operate as a 
causal mechanism or path to regime change and democratic outcomes. 
Shultziner focuses on cases such as the Soweto Uprising in South 
Africa and the Montgomery bus boycott to illustrate the relationship 
between repression and backfire as transformative events.
Elite defection has been identified as an important factor in the 
success or failure of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, demanding 
that we delve into the ways in which agents of repression experience 
the repression they carry out. In her exploration of successful nonvio-
lent revolutions, Sharon Erickson Nepstad (2011) found that defections 
by security forces were an important strategic factor. Nonviolent resis-
tance has an advantage in managing and framing repression because it 
can create dilemmas for repressors.
Rachel MacNair reminds us in chapter 4, “The Psychology of 
Agents of Repression: The Paradox of Defection,” that aggression and 
fear are not physical properties that people hold in their hands, but are 
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psychological experiences. Agents of repression do not merely follow 
orders; they are caught up in complex psychological dynamics and risk 
suffering what she calls perpetration induced traumatic stress (PITS; 
see MacNair 2002 and chapter 4 in this volume).
In recent years, the nature of civil resistance has changed with the 
increased role of the Internet and social media in political processes. 
Jessica Beyer and Jennifer Earl bring their extensive expertise in this 
emerging field to bear in chapter 5, “Backfire Online: Studying Reac-
tions to the Repression of Internet Activism.” It is crucial to under-
stand the ways in which online activism and the activists behind it 
interact with the state and other entities interested in silencing them. 
Drawing on recent cases studies, Beyer and Earl systematically present 
various forms of online repression and show how it has backfired on 
elites. They explore the affinities between different types of Internet 
activism and repressive tactics, identifying multiple levels of analysis 
of how backfire and deterrence can be differentiated according to the 
actors involved (individual versus group and public versus private).
A second major aspect of the book turns to repression manage-
ment; that is, how nonviolent resisters—but also repressors—have 
attempted to shape the outcome of repression to their benefit. We 
begin with the firsthand experience of Jenni Williams, founder of the 
movement Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA). In chapter 6, “Over-
coming Fear to Overcome Repression,” Williams emphasizes the 
importance of establishing a movement culture that prioritizes non-
violence and encourages empowerment through shared leadership and 
the creative use of traditional cultural themes to withstand and blunt 
repression. When WOZA transformed the traditional role of mother-
hood to scold and challenge the dictatorship of Mugabe, the activists 
were met with a brutal repression of their movement. By accepting 
and even courting arrest, Williams argues, the activists took away the 
regime’s major weapon of repression, turning it instead into a source of 
empowerment for the movement and individual participants, increas-
ing the costs of the regime’s efforts to thwart them. They mobilized 
a campaign of “tough love,” transforming a culture of fear into a cul-
ture of resistance and constructing a creative leadership structure that 
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allowed them to be more flexible in their tactics than the rigid authori-
tarian police establishment bound by its limited repertoire.
Chapter 7, “Culture and Repression Management,” focuses on 
the symbolic aspects of repression and its backfire. We conceptualize 
nonviolent struggle as a dance between an establishment and its dis-
sidents, a regime and its insurgents, as they contest the frames used to 
make meaning of repressive events. This chapter explores proactive 
efforts by nonviolent activists to choreograph actions in ways that 
help to ensure the backfire effect of repression by clearly establish-
ing the aggression of the agents of repression. In chapter 8, “‘Smart’ 
Repression,” we address the growing efforts by elites to be more stra-
tegic about how they use repression, in order to mitigate the effects 
of its potentially backfiring. That chapter examines a relatively unex-
plored aspect of repression, the use of tactics that are deliberately 
crafted to demobilize movements while mitigating or eliminating a 
backfire effect.
Dalia Ziada gives us a participant’s-eye-view of the Egyptian revo-
lution of 2011 in chapter 9, “Egypt: Military Strategy and the 2011 
Revolution,” although she is also familiar with the literature on stra-
tegic nonviolent action. What she found most remarkable was that 
the army in some instances chose not to use violence during the cit-
izen uprising, and ended up collaborating with the activists to oust 
President Mubarak, although they returned to the usual armed forces 
modus operandi after seizing power from Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 2014. Ziada provides a firsthand account of the events 
of 2011 based on her own participation in the revolution and draws on 
her interviews with Egyptian and American military personnel.
In chapter 10, “Repression Engendering Creative Nonviolent 
Action in Thailand,” Chaiwat Satha-Anand explores activist creativity 
following repression in Thailand. He argues that repression, such as 
the violent actions in 2010 of the Thai government against protesters 
in the Red Shirts movement, created space for new movement leader-
ship and the introduction of creative nonviolent resistance. He calls 
this dynamic “the cleansing effect of violent repression.” In this Thai 
case, Sombat Boonngamanong developed a series of highly symbolic 
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and creative flash mob actions that drew on a history of nonviolent 
resistance in Thai society.
Finally, veteran activist, scholar, and trainer George Lakey con-
cludes the volume by providing insights from decades of practical 
experience and reflection in chapter 11, “Making Meaning of Pain and 
Fear: Enacting the Paradox of Repression.” According to Lakey, non-
violent activists create narratives that provide meaning for their risks, 
injuries, suffering, and losses, helping them to transform pain and fear 
into opportunities for mobilization. These stories in turn have con-
sequences for the tactics and strategies they choose and help to trig-
ger the paradox of repression. Activists use these stories to prepare in 
advance for repressive events by training and shaping confrontations.
By weaving together these case studies, scholarly analysis, and 
activists’ reflection, we aim to shed light on how the paradox of 
repression works in multiple contexts and how activists have managed 
repression to enhance its potential to backfire and empower resistance.
Repression as Relational Conflict
Nonviolent resistance is based in large part on the strategic harness-
ing of relational power. We focus on one subform in this volume: the 
strategic cultivation of the paradox of repression. Sometimes, when 
one party takes coercive action that violates basic norms, its ability 
to rally support and cooperation—its legitimacy—is undermined, 
threatening its capacity to meet its own goals. The contributors to this 
volume present cases in which authorities or elites used intimidation, 
coercion, and sometimes violence in attempts to crush dissident move-
ments; but in each case, intimidation and physical force were seen to 
violate norms of proportionate response and helped to mobilize move-
ment recruits. Elites’ efforts rebounded on them, undermining their 
legitimacy and diminishing their ability to govern as they wished.4
4. These unintended consequences may occur without any framing by oppo-
nents, and as the case of the Catholic modernist movement demonstrates, repression 
can activate a movement that did not exist previously (Kurtz 1986).
20 | Lee A .  Smithey a n d Lester R .  K u rtz
Moreover, activists can rhetorically frame the actions of their 
opponents or can choreograph their own actions in ways that draw 
attention to repression by opponents. By adopting nonviolent tactics, 
activists can generate a striking contrast between their own actions 
and the “unfair” tactics of their opponents. The dissonance that gap 
creates can, in turn, provoke a moral outrage that increases the sup-
port and involvement of local and third parties. Such a contrast can 
also cause factions to develop among a movement’s opponents as 
some withdraw their cooperation and refuse to participate in further 
repression. When repression does occur against nonviolent civilians, 
it may serve as a deterrent to other regimes, as when Gorbachev (1996) 
took note of the negative consequences worldwide of the Tiananmen 
Square massacre and decided not to back communist states across 
Eastern Europe with force when they faced nonviolent uprisings a few 
months later (see Smithey and Kurtz 1999).
Activists may also draw on local indigenous cultural resources to 
sensitize potential recruits and sympathetic publics to acts of repres-
sion (Sørensen and Vinthagen 2012). Legacies may be framed that 
perpetuate the paradox of repression long after the immediate crisis 
has passed. Dissidents in Czechoslovakia in 1989 commemorated the 
death of a young student, Jan Palach, who self-immolated in response 
to the 1968 invasion of Prague by Warsaw Pact troops two decades 
earlier. Similarly, the legacy of the British Army’s killing of civilians on 
Bloody Sunday in 1972 continues to influence Northern Ireland poli-
tics today, more than forty years after the event. Figuring out how to 
harness cultural resources requires indigenous creativity or what James 
Jasper (1997) has called “artfulness” in developing effective tactics. The 
ability of activists to design effective nonviolent collective action cre-
atively that mitigates repression or induces it to backfire may develop 
out of rational strategizing, but it will often emerge instinctively from 
the habitus, the intimate, unspoken, and inarticulable perception of 
relations that is uniquely local. This creativity is the source of agency, 
which complicates cost-benefit paradigms since it is elusive and diffi-
cult to measure, and yet can significantly enhance the power potential 
of groups who might otherwise be considered susceptible to repression.
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In short, although the paradox of repression is a phenomenon that 
is widely glossed over in both policy and academic circles, it seems an 
obvious and ubiquitous fact in twenty-first century political culture 
and a key element in the history of successful nonviolent movements. 
We hope that this collection of studies will enhance understanding 
by reconceptualizing repression as an interaction between conflict-
ing parties, by expanding our scope of the spheres in which repres-
sion occurs, by delving into the social, psychological, and cultural 
dimensions of repression, by thinking more closely about the costs of 
repression among agents of repression, and by introducing repression 
management to explore ways in which strategic nonviolent activists 
become powerful agents within repressive contexts.
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